Amid security concerns and threats to its projects from the instability in Myanmar, India deports illegal Myanmar nationals
03-05-2024
India, on 2 May, deported the first group of Myanmar nationals who after the 2021 military coup had taken shelter in neighbouring North-East Indian states. The deportation came after weeks of efforts that were hampered by fierce fighting between Myanmar's rebel forces and the ruling junta. The intense fighting between the junta and resistance forces has also adversely affected the India-funded Kaladan multi-modal transit transport project, including the development of Sittwe port, even if New Delhi has said it remains committed to these projects in the long run. The China factor has further accentuated the strategic significance of Myanmar to India. Unlike India, China’s approach to Myanmar extends beyond engagement with the military junta – it encompasses interactions with the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the National Unity Government (NUG), which are pitted against the military junta.
China’s burgeoning political and economic clout within Myanmar, coupled with its efforts to secure access to the Bay of Bengal via Myanmar, has evoked concerns for India. Myanmar’s location at the trijunction of the South, Southeast, and East Asia crossroads is a gateway for India to expand its land and maritime connectivity to the rest of Southeast Asia and beyond. The country is crucial for India’s aspirations to increase its influence in Southeast Asia, specifically among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, through its Act East Policy. In addition to its strategic importance, New Delhi considers Myanmar an attractive market and a reliable economic partner for its growing economy. However, thousands of civilians and hundreds of troops from Myanmar have taken shelter in India since the 2021 military coup. In total, over 45,000 Myanmar nationals have taken refuge in bordering Indian states. This has worried New Delhi, which, citing national security concerns, had earlier announced plans to fence its 1,643-km long border with Myanmar and end the existing visa-free movement policy.
Since late last year, Myanmar’s resistance forces and armed groups aligned with the government in exile have overrun scores of military bases and key trading and crossing points on the borders with China, India and Bangladesh. The military junta has suffered a string of humiliating defeats at the hands of the resistance forces since three powerful armed groups – the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – joined hands to launch a coordinated offensive against government forces last October.
Reuters reported on 2 May that at least 38 refugees were deported on 2 May by the Indian border state of Manipur, which plans to send back a total of 77 people as it copes with sporadic violence that has killed at least 220 people since ethnic clashes broke out in May last year. After the deportations, Manipur Chief Minister N. Biren Singh said in a social media post that “Without any discrimination, we have completed the first phase of deportation of illegal immigrants from Myanmar. The state government is continuing the identification of illegal immigrants”. Singh added that one Indian national was also repatriated by Myanmar. India's efforts to secure its borders and reassess the Free Movement Regime (FMR) reflect a response to Myanmar's instability.
Amid intense clashes between the Chin Defence Force (CDF) guerrillas and the Myanmar military near the Indo-Myanmar international border, an additional approximately 5,000 refugees, including 39 army personnel, had also sought refuge in the North-East Indian state of Mizoram, bordering Manipur, late last year. Prior to that surge in refugee numbers, Mizoram was already hosting over 30,000 Chin refugees from Myanmar following the 2021 military coup. Additionally, the state had accommodated more than 12,000 displaced people from the Kuki-Zomi community due to ethnic tensions in Manipur. The Mizos, Chins, and Kuki-Zomi communities share a common ethnicity, further intertwining the complex refugee situation in the region. The influx of Chin Kuki refugees from Myanmar was also identified by Indian officials as a contributing factor to the violence in Manipur.
India has actively pursued regional connectivity with Myanmar through critical projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Project (KMMP) and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Project (IMTTP). The KMMP aims to improve connectivity to India’s North East via Bangladesh and Myanmar, linking India’s Kolkata port to Myanmar’s Sittwe port and extending to Mizoram through highways in Myanmar. The IMTTP, conversely, proposes to connect India’s border town of Moreh to Mae Sot in Thailand via Myanmar, establishing a land route for seamless trade, business, education, and tourism among all three countries.
The Indian daily The Hindustan Times on 10 April reminded that even before the resistance forces in Myanmar launched their offensive, Indian projects in the country had been hit by adverse developments since 2020, initially due to the Covid-19 pandemic and later because of the political crisis after the military coup in February 2021. It quoted Indian officials as saying that “The project’s implementation has been affected because of the security situation in Myanmar. The early completion of the two projects is important for enhanced commercial relations with Asean nations and, thereby, the development of India’s eight northeastern states”. The report added that bilateral trade between India and Myanmar had also been hit by fighting and instability. According to official data, India’s merchandise exports to Myanmar fell by 9.63% from $893 million in 2021-22 to $807 million in 2022-23. Imports from Myanmar to India contracted year-on-year by 4.7% to $955 million in 2022-23.
India’s key Act East Policy projects in Myanmar have faced significant delays. The 68-mile highway linking Sittwe Port to Mizoram under the KMMP still needs to be completed, despite the Sittwe Port already being functional and the project nearing completion on the Mizoram side in India. The IMTTP is also reportedly 70% complete on the Indian side, and is nearing completion in Thailand. However, Myanmar has not provided an exact progress update on the project, despite the country’s Trade Minister Aung Naing Oo mentioning recently that only a portion of the highway still needs to be completed, which will take another three years. The political unrest has slowed down both critical projects as violence has escalated between the EAOs and the military junta.
It is also pertinent that Myanmar’s EAOs and the NUG control the areas through which the Indian projects pass — the Chin, Sagaing, and Rakhine states. Also, the Paletwa township, strategically crucial for the KMMP, is now controlled by the Arakan Army, with which India has reportedly had little contact. An Arakan Army spokesperson had earlier assured a leading Indian news outlet that the outfit would not harm the Kaladan project. However, the escalating conflict in Myanmar has endangered the project’s completion and future operation, and calls have been made for India to reassess its approach in the region to protect its interests and ensure the success of this pivotal initiative amidst the crisis.
Sreeparna Banerjee of the Indian think tank Observer Research Foundation (ORF) wrote on 16 March that “Since 1990, India’s policy toward Myanmar has emphasised engagement with the ruling powers that place a premium on security and political interests over promoting democratic principles in neighbouring nations. This policy has been exemplified by initiatives such as the recent visit of an Indian Army delegation to Myanmar, led by Lieutenant General Harjeet Singh Sahi, aiming to fortify bilateral relations, military cooperation, and joint endeavours for peace and development in border areas. Amid the escalating situation in regions like Paletwa and Sittwe and given the Arakan Army’s recent declarations, India finds itself at a critical juncture, necessitating a re-evaluation and potential recalibration of its approach toward Myanmar. This imperative involves not only issuing advisories for Indian citizens to leave the region but also actively engaging with a broader spectrum of stakeholders”.
Banerjee further opined that “The political stability of Myanmar is of paramount importance to India, particularly for the northeastern region and its connectivity projects, such as the KMTTP, since the project is not only a regional connectivity endeavour but a pivotal element of India's strategic ambitions to counter Chinese influence and enhance stability in its northeastern territories. The AA's dominance over critical areas along the Kaladan project route and its assurances to not disrupt the project highlights the complexities of engaging with non-state actors in conflict zones. India may find itself needing to strike a careful balance between respecting Myanmar's sovereignty and pragmatically engaging with groups like the AA to protect its strategic interests. Furthermore, the AA's changing political stance, its interactions with the National Unity Government (NUG), and other ethnic armed groups indicate a shifting political landscape in Myanmar. This suggests that India's policy towards Myanmar must be flexible, accounting for the dynamic nature of alliances and power structures within the country”.
Writing in the Eurasian Times, Ashish Dangwal expressed the view that “A significant concern for India revolves around China’s reported backing of the brotherhood alliance, particularly in their pledge to safeguard Chinese investments in Myanmar. There are also indications that the Arakan Army is receiving substantial support, both financial and military, from China. If confirmed, these reports raise worries in Delhi about Beijing’s potential use of armed factions to impede India’s infrastructure projects in Myanmar. Additionally, the Arakan Army’s track record of targeting Indian-backed ventures like the Kaladan project while seemingly avoiding interference with Chinese endeavors in the region is often cited as evidence of its alignment with China’s strategic interests”.
Dangwal further wrote that “Meanwhile, China’s economic footprint along Myanmar’s Bay of Bengal coast has seen significant expansion. Beijing has activated oil and natural gas pipelines originating from the Shwe gas fields near Kyaukphyu in the Rakhine State, extending to Yunnan province in China. In December 2023, China inked additional agreements with the Myanmar military to operationalize a deep-sea port and establish a special economic zone near Kyaukphyu. Kyaukphyu Port is just one of several points in the region under Chinese control, including a naval base in Cambodia, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, and a naval station at the port of Djibouti. Located on the north-western corner of Yanbye Island on Combermere Bay, 250 miles north-west of Yangon in Rakhine province, where the Myanmar military, better known as the Tatmadaw, is engaged in conflict with the Arakan Army, Kyaukphyu holds strategic significance”.
Elaborating on this significance, Dangwal underscored that “Upon completion, China’s Kyaukphyu port project will serve as the new southern terminus of the 1,700-kilometer-long China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), linking it to the Chinese city of Kunming. This corridor holds immense significance as it provides landlocked Yunnan Province with direct access to the Indian Ocean, thereby opening up new trade routes and economic opportunities. The project also serves as a strategic bypass for Chinese shipping, which will offer an alternative route to circumvent the congested Malacca Strait. The Kyaukphyu port project will ease maritime congestion, facilitating smoother trade flows between China and key global markets in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe”.
In these circumstances, experts are of the view that India could consider rethinking its strategy towards Myanmar to counter China’s growing influence there, even as the ongoing political instability and continuing violence not only hampers New Delhi’s aim of enhancing regional connectivity, but can also potentially contribute towards reigniting insurgency in India’s fragile North East region.
